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ALBERT THE GREAT AND 
THE HIERARCHY OF SCIENCES 
Mark D. Jordan 
The paper follows Albert through three of his discussions of the hierarchy of 
sciences. The first discussion presents what seems a straightforward account 
of Aristotle's trichotomy of speculative sciences. It remains unsatisfying so 
far as it exacerbates tensions latent in Aristotle. In the second discussion, 
Albert attempts to resolve these tensions by supplying a narrative of the 
mind's ascent along the hierarchy. But the narrative fails to describe convinc-
ingly the power by which the mind is rendered capable of ascending. The 
description is provided finally by the third discussion. In it, Albert identifies 
the topmost science as rhetorical theology that wants to persuade its students 
to advance towards God in faith. By completing the narrative in this way, 
Albert suggests that any adequate discussion of the hierarchy of sciences will 
not be a contextless description, but a rhetorically situated exhortation. 
The topic of the "hierarchy of the sciences" is a knot of teachings and ques-
tions handed down to medieval Latin philosophy by various ancient and 
patristic texts. I For modern readers, the knot is tied most obviously by Plato 
in Republic 6 and 7. There the Platonic Socrates considers together the soul's 
powers, their objects, languages for describing them, their conversion by 
philosophy, and their perfection in the education of future rulers. The Repub-
lic was not available to medieval Latin readers, of course. They had to learn 
of the topic from Plato's successors. Early medieval readers could discover 
one succession in Boethius on Aristotle, but others were available in 
Augustine's retelling of Stoic and neo-Platonic philosophy, in Seneca and 
Cicero, in the encyclopedias of Martianus Capella and Isidore, and in the 
mystagogical treatises of Ps-Dionysius. By the thirteenth century, there were 
added to these texts not only Aristotle's several accounts of the hierarchy, but 
variations on them and on Plato by Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes. 
The Platonic knot of teachings and questions is handed to an author like 
Albert the Great, then, loosened in some parts and tightened in others. It had 
been loosened so far as the Aristotelian tradition succeeded in extracting 
issues for discussion and in providing a technical vocabulary for them. Albert 
did not need to approach the topic unaided. But the knot had been tightened 
so far as Christian and then Islamic authors extended the hierarchy of sciences 
to include theologies derived from revelation. The questions and teachings 
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surrounding the hierarchy of sciences became the privileged topic for reflect-
ing on the relation of Christian theology to philosophy understood as the best 
of human learning. 
It is worth hearing Albert's reflections on the topic for several reasons. 
First, he was at once the boldest and most assiduous Latin commentator on 
Aristotle of the thirteenth century-a century not lacking in thoughtful com-
mentators. Second, Albert was justly renowned among his contemporaries for 
having mastered so many sciences. 2 If anyone had traversed the hierarchy in 
its details, he had. Finally, Albert understood himself to be first and last a 
Dominican teacher of theology. Thus his interest in the hiearchy of sciences, 
whatever else it might be, is certainly evangelical. If nothing else, the public 
conditions of Albert's authorship require that he address the role of revealed 
theology among the other sciences. What better author, then, in whom to try 
to untie some of the doctrines and questions? 
Albert discusses the hierarchy of the sciences most directly and most con-
secutively in his paraphrases of Aristotle. He also treats of it in other pas-
sages, of course. Some appear predictably, say as attached to passages on 
knowledge in commentaries on the Dionysian corpus. 3 Other appearances are 
more surprising. Albert not only mastered the digression as a teaching device, 
he had a theory to justify its use. 4 A complete list of Albert's scattered remarks 
on the hierarchy of sciences would be difficult both to compile and to exploit 
intelligently. I have chosen instead to concentrate on three texts, which to-
gether span more than two decades of Albert's thinking. I begin with the 
paraphrase of the Physics Uust before 1250), move next to the short treatise 
011 the Intellect alld the Intelligible (between 1254-1257 and 1260), and 
conclude with the Summa theologiae (finished after 1274). My argument will 
be that the three texts not only take up different threads of the topic, but that 
they show Albert making progress in appreciating how tangled they are. 
Some preliminary cautions need to be noted before reading the first texts, 
the two Aristotelian paraphrases. The paraphrases enact a single project, to 
make all the parts of philosophy intelligible to the Latins. 5 The chronology 
of the paraphrases has been fairly well worked out by Weisheipl,6 but their 
relation to the rest of Albert's corpus has not. At several points in the text, 
Albert disclaims the teaching of the paraphrases. They are to be read, he 
insists, not as expressions of his own mind, but as expositions of the sense 
of Aristotle.7 Yet the paraphrases range widely in their choice of topics and 
interlocutors, and Albert frequently interrupts the plain reading of Aristotle 
to indulge controversy or to offer erudition. 
The contrast with Aquinas's "commentaries" on Aristotle is striking. While 
Aquinas enters no explicit disclaimers, he does in fact restrict himself to the 
Aristotelian text and so rarely speaks in his own voice. It is a rule for the 
careful reading of Thomas, then, that passages from expositions cannot be 
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mixed indiscriminately with passages from works written in his own voice. 
Is the same rule to be applied to Albert's paraphrases? I think not. What the 
Albertine paraphrases have to say on the hierarchy of sciences is clearly 
intended to be more than a simple reading of Aristotle. The paraphrases want 
to remake an idealized Aristotelian corpus into a comprehensive presentation 
of philosophy. Albert promises as much in the Physics and then fulfills the 
promise abundantly, especially in a treatise like On the Intellect. 
1. Orders of Abstraction and Learning 
The opening treatise of Albert's paraphrase of the Physics is a prologue to 
the study of Aristotelian science. It begins by enunciating Aristotle's di vision 
of speculative knowledge into metaphysics, mathematics, and physics. 8 First 
in the order of nature is metaphysics or "theology," the universal science that 
treats being (ens) so far as it is being, conceived entirely without motion or 
sensible matter. Next comes mathematics, which conceives its objects "with 
motion and sensible matter according to [their] manner of existing (esse), but 
not according to the account (ratio) [to be given of them]."9 The lowest 
science is physics, which conceives its objects with motion and sensible 
matter both according to their manner of existing and according to the account 
given of them. As preliminary examples of objects appropriate to the three 
sciences, Albert mentions substance for metaphysics, a Euclidean circle or 
line for mathematics, and the heavens, an element, or something compounded 
out of elements for physics. For the last, he adds a distinction between phys-
ical and logical definitions. Natural things must be defined in physics by 
reference to sensible matter and a concrete subject; a definition merely in 
terms of common notions of genus and difference, understood as simple and 
uni versal, would belong to logic. They are useless to physics. IO 
Once he has set out the basic scheme of the trichotomy of sciences, Albert 
begins to augment it. 11 He augments it first by glossing the objects of the 
three sciences. Thus metaphysics treats only the intelligible; mathematics, 
the intelligible and imaginable; physics, the intelligible, imaginable, and sen-
sible. 12 Again, each of the sciences corresponds to an understanding of body.13 
Metaphysics considers body simply and without qualification, retracing it to 
being. Mathematics considers "intelligible matter" or "imaginable quantity" 
according to the various figures found in it. 14 Physics or natural philosophy 
as such considers natural body universally, while its branches take up one or 
another kind of physical body. The sub-division of physics makes clear that 
it is a "general" science, that is, a group or cluster of particular sciences. So 
too is mathematics. Metaphysics is the universal science, but for that very 
reason cannot be sub-divided into fields. 
Albert augments the trichotomy of sciences more interestingly by drawing 
out its implications for teaching or inquiry. He begins by remarking that the 
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objects of metaphysics are the causes of the objects of mathematics and 
physics. Thus the principles of mathematics and physics can be borrowed 
from metaphysics, where they are "tested" or "proved" (probata).15 But he 
immediately substitutes a model in terms of whole and parts: metaphysics is 
the universal science, while the other two are more restricted sciences that 
treat "parts" of being. Only metaphysics can be concerned to demonstrate prin-
ciples properly from a universal grasp of being. 16 The logician can also seek to 
establish some version of them by proceeding from the common argumentative 
principles of all sciences. Here as elsewhere, the verbal universality of logic 
mirrors the real universality of metaphysicsY Logic also teaches that true sci-
ence proceeds demonstratively from first principles to proximate principles. 
Any other procedure is topical, that is, dialectical or rhetorical. 18 
Still, the downward flow of causes and principles in the hierarchy must be 
reversed so far as human learning is concerned. Our teaching must begin with 
what is easier, and what is easier for us is what lies near at hand. Good 
teaching begins from what can be grasped most immediately by sense, imag-
ination, or intellect. Moreover, instruction in physics must begin with acquir-
ing certain principles useful in arguing more particular conclusions. Hence 
Albert construes the ancient half-title of the Physics, apo phones or ex auditu, 
to mean that the principles given in the book are had rather by hearing than 
by demonstration. 19 
The precept to begin teaching near at hand leads Albert quickly enough to 
more interesting inversions of the hierarchy and to more difficult questions 
about the interdependence of the sciences. He reads in the Aristotelian text 
that every science is concerned with principles, causes, and elements. 2o He 
then argues that it is only in physics that one can learn principles, causes, 
and elements fully and as such. Even though metaphysics considers all of the 
causes, it treats form and matter not as constitutive of things, but as reducible 
to the understanding of substance. 21 How can it be that something necessary 
to all scientific demonstration is learned fully only in physics? Albert replies 
first by saying that principles and causes are known sufficiently in each 
science for it to proceed. He then offers an alternate argument that begins by 
distinguishing prior axioms (dignitates) from proximate ones. 
Sometimes demonstration proceeds from what are first and true, and these 
are principles (prillcipia). Sometimes however [it proceeds] from what are 
taken on faith (jides) from what are first and true, which [things] however 
are not proximate. And sometimes [it proceeds] by what are last and essential 
(esselltialia). Therefore what are first and true are the principles. And what 
are from the first and true, and accepted further in order to infer other things, 
are the causes: since propositions are the cause of the conclusion. And the 
elements are proximate, [and] they are required to prove nothing further. 22 
Albert fails to draw out this explication at any length, preferring to argue that 
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not every science must proceed from principles, causes, and elements in the 
same way. But the explication would seem to suggest that the higher sciences 
(:an borrow the pedagogy of causes from physics on "faith," that is, as some-
thing already learned. 
Yet in physics too there is a difference between the order of nature and the 
order of our learning. We begin from a confused apprehension of the most 
<:ommon things. This apprehension must be analyzed or "divided" in order 
for us to discover the special efficient causes and the particular elements of 
natural objects. 23 Albert gives two examples. We know the whole circle that 
is to be defined before we know the parts of its Euclidean definition. Again, 
a child begins by calling all men "father" and all women "mother," and only 
then discerns the particular man who is father and the particular woman who 
is mother. 
Human learning moves through the physical world in much the same way-
and so very differently from the demonstrative deductions of metaphysics 
and mathematics or even the causal order of nature itself. Albert first dis-
tinguishes three, cumulative stages of sense awareness: the apprehension 
(acceptio) of a particular sense, the apprehension of the common sense power, 
and the apprehension of what he calls "a certain cognition of confused rea-
son."24It is the latter that allows the child to know that his father is this male, 
rather than an ass. But before the child can know that this male is father, she 
must know that some male is father, and even earlier that a human being can 
be a father.25 In other words, the child must begin by apprehending what 
Albert calls an indefinite individual (individuum vagum) within a universal 
genus. The child starts as it were with the highest genus, substance, and then 
works downwards through the Porphyrian tree until the indefiniteness is 
resolved into a very specific individual (individuum signatum). Albert repeats 
Avicenna's example of recognizing someone at a distance: We first see some-
thing (substance), then something moving (animal), then something erect 
(human being), and finally something with particular properties (Socrates). 
Albert takes this account not only as psychologically plausible, but as reflect-
ing the development of brain physiology. Moreover, and more remarkably for 
Albert, this process of composition, which moves from an indistinct simple 
thing to a distinct composite thing, is proper to physics and to no other 
science. 
At the end of the prologue to Aristotelian science, then, Albert's account 
of the hierarchy seems to be pulled in several different directions. First, it 
has become clear that the order of abstraction is the reverse of the order of 
human discovery. We discover by moving from vague abstractions to definite 
particulars. Moreover, a similar reversal occurs with regard to principles. The 
Aristotelian trichotomy suggests that the principles of every science will be 
made secure only at the top of the hierarchy, in metaphysics. But Albert has 
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argued explicitly that it is only in physics that the central terms of science 
are learned fully. Again, there seems to an inversion of the hierarchy in the 
curious relation between metaphysics and logic. Logic seems to offer a verbal 
or abstract anticipation of the precepts of metaphysics. Yet logic is prelimi-
nary even to physics and so stands at the lowest point of the hierarchy, on 
the boundary between the liberal arts and philosophy. 
There are technical responses to these reversals and inversions. In para-
phrasing the Categories, for example, Albert explores at some length the 
questions, whether logic is a distinct study and whether it is a part of phil os-
ophy.26 One could also find passages in which the oppositions of abstraction 
and human discovery are addressed. But technical attempts at reducing the 
tensions in Albert's account would obscure one of its most interesting lessons. 
While the Platonic Line is constructed around a narrative of human learning, 
the Aristotelian trichotomy begins as a division of objects and then proceeds 
to match them with accomplished bodies of ideal teaching, that is, with 
demonstrations. Aristotle's notorious silences in regard to the discovery of 
principles or the intuition of essences carryover into the hierarchy of sciences 
as omissions of the processes of discovery. When Albert attempts to describe 
human learning, he can only exacerbate the tensions of the basic Aristotelian 
account. What he must do instead is to begin with the narrative he wants to 
tell about the mind's ascent along the hierarchy. 
2. Orders of Introspection and Completion 
The most original of Albert's treatments of the hierarchy of sciences is On 
the Intellect and the Intelligible. He composed it to fill a gap in the parva 
naturalia, the shorter Aristotelian essays on biological topics. The gap falls 
textually between On Sense and What is Sensed and On Sleep and Wakeful-
ness. Albert argues that there can be no discussion of sleep until there has 
been further study of the intellect beyond what has been said in On the Soul 
3.27 So he interposes a short treatise in three parts: on the nature of the 
intellect as such (1.1), on the intelligible as it belongs to intellect (1.2), and 
on the unity and diversity of the intellect with regard to the intelligibles (1.3). 
To this treatise Albert then adds a second book, on the natural completion or 
perfection of the intellectual soul. While the topic of the hierarchy of sciences 
figures at several points in the first book, the narrative of ascent preoccupies 
the second. 
The Aristotelian trichotomy of sciences appears first towards the end of 
Book 1, in the exposition of the kinds of intelligibles. 28 Albert wants to 
compare the objects of the three sciences with the limited power of human 
intellection. Metaphysical or theological objects exceed this power; mathe-
matical objects are most proportioned to it; physical objects fall below it in 
regard to certainty and firmness because of privation, matter, and motion. 29 
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This gradation of intelligibility is reflected in the sequence of demonstration 
itself. The principles of demonstration "have much of the light and form of 
intellect," but conclusions have less of this light and have it only as an effect. 
Thus the habitual possession of principles is given one name, 'intellectus', 
while the possession of conclusions takes another, 'scientia'. Reasoning 
(ratiocinatio) is the path (decursus) of light from principles to conclusions. 
Albert appends to this account a gradation of intellects, that is, a ranking 
of different intellectual powers and states. 30 He begins, obviously enough, 
with the possible and active intellects of On the Soul 3. Next comes the formal 
intellect, which arises when intellectual light produces a form in the soul. 
Formal intellect is divided first into practical and speculative. It is next 
divided, more importantly, into simple and composite. Simple formal intellect 
is "an intelligence of non-complex things." Composite formal intellect is "an 
intelligence of complex things" compounded by enunciation, syllogism, or 
another form of argument. Composite formal intellect is further divided into 
an inborn intellect of principles and an "accomplished" intellect (intellectus 
adeptus) acquired by discovery or study. 
Now this schema of intellectual powers and states foreshadows the struc-
ture of Book 2. Albert expands the schema there by inserting the "effected" 
or actualized intellect between the intellect of principles and the accom-
plished intellect, then by adding an assimilative intellect at the end of the 
list. The effected intellect (intellectus in effectu) is intellect actualized by an 
abstracted form that has been illuminated by the agent intellect. 31 The assim-
ilative or assimilating intellect "is that in which a human being, so far as is 
possible or permitted to him, rises proportionately to the divine intellect. "32 
Thus the complete hierarchy of intellects is given by Albert as possible, agent, 
formal (or of principles), effected, accomplished, and assimilative or divine. 33 
This hierarchy of intellects was known to Albert from several sources, none 
of which he took over unmodified. Let me mention two. Alfarabi's brief On 
the Intellect and the Intellected describes a sequence of five intellects: in 
potency, in effect, accomplished, agent, and divine. 34 The agent intellect 
appears at the end of the list because it is, for Alfarabi, a separate form, the 
cause of other intellects, and the giver of forms to bodies. It stands one step 
below the divine. Albert could hardly accept such a description, and so he 
changes both the agent intellect's position in the hierarchy and its attributes. 
Consider, as a second source, Avicenna's On the Soul 5.6. The sequence of 
intellects is less orderly here, but one does read of a material intellect, an 
intellect in effect, an agent intellect, and an accomplished intellect. 35 Avi-
cenna adds to these what he calls "holy intellect," which is the preeminent 
virtue of prophecy.36 Albert too will speak of a holy mind, but will do so as 
something known to philosophy. 
Whatever its sources, what is to be learned from this hierarchy? It serves 
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to show several things. First, most simply, Albert can diagnose by it what is 
needed for different kinds of minds. 37 Some minds are naturally more attached 
to imagination and sense; they are incapable of learning except by sensible 
examples. They cannot attain to metaphysics. A second or middle mind is 
helped towards understanding by prophetic or divine teaching. A third kind 
of mind is born to understand things by itself or with only slight teaching. 
This is the philosophic mind, also the mind of the prophet. 
Still, second, the hierarchy of intellects permits Albert to explain something 
of how human learning is fulfilled in a glimpse of the divine. It is important 
to be careful here. Albert emphasizes at the beginning of the second book 
that he intends to speak about the degrees by which the intellect rises to 
completion, not about its last and highest happiness. 38 The whole discussion 
takes place within the ambit of philosophy, not of Christian theology. Yet it 
describes the highest condition of assimilative intellect not only as a vision 
of the divine, but as a kind of cleansed holiness. 
Albert first characterizes assimilative intellect as an ascent to the highest 
cause of intelligences and intelligibility. The ascent is possible because the 
divine light has made itself manifest at four lower levels of apprehension. 39 
It reaches down first to the essential differences of each thing, making them 
manifest to lower powers. It is, second, the light in which intelligible forms 
have the being of abstraction or separation for the possible intellect, which 
is its image (imago). The third manifestation is that in which there appear 
universally in the agent intellect truths that come from the light of the inner 
microcosm (minor mundus). The divine light is joined to the agent intellect 
not as light to darkness or privation or potency, but as one light to another, 
if inferior light, which it strengthens and beautifies. The fourth illumination, 
the last, is what is manifest in the application of divine light to the intelli-
gences that move the celestial spheres. 
Now this account of how the divine mind discloses itself along the steps 
of the hierarchy makes clear one thing that was not clear in the Aristotelian 
trichotomy. Progress up the levels of intelligibility is progress in self-knowl-
edge. Albert has already stressed that the human mind is an image of the 
divine mind, and then drawn the conclusion that our minds' work is to find 
themselves amid the distraction of bodies. 40 Albert now prescribes four steps 
towards self-discovery.41 They are described both in terms of objects to be 
thought and in terms of effects on the mind thinking. The mind is freed from 
flesh, from time and extension, from matter, so that it turns more to the divine 
and so becomes more itself. Albert's language itself takes on unusual color-
ing, and he quotes moving passages from Apuleius and Dionysius on the 
properties of the mind set free. 42 He is even willing to admit a kind of 
philosophic prophecy.43 What he insists on, above all, is that ascent along the 
hierarchy of intellects is the human soul coming into knowledge of itself-of 
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its descent from the divine, of its role as pedagogue in rationalizing the bodily 
world, of its own immortality.44 The teaching here is not a slip or a simple 
excess. Albert will say many of the same things near the end of the series of 
paraphrases in 011 the Nature alld Origin of the SoulY 
Still the lyrical ending of On the Intellect, or the exemplary stories in the 
later work, cannot dispel doubts that Albert has not been true to his claim 
that he would speak only of philosophical matters. It is certainly true that 
Albert has philosophical sources in which contemplations and mystical puri-
fications are discussed. But it is equally true that he cannot appropriate these 
sources as they stand. For a Christian theologian, the agency of ascent to the 
divine is not simply a diffuse illumination. It is a gift of grace announced and 
accomplished through a specific revelation. So what Albert has gained in 
providing a narrative of ascent, he must now secure by naming the power 
that makes ascent possible. 
3. Orders of Persuasion to Piety 
The Summa theologiae was certainly the last of Albert's major works to be 
finished, and the main part of it was probably composed after the Aristotelian 
paraphrases. 46 It begins, by well established tradition, with a prologue and 
disputed questions on theology as science. The prologue folIows one of the 
fixed patterns for an accessus or introduction: a Scriptural verse (prothema) 
is dissected phrase by phrase to uncover the outline of a doctrine about 
revealed theology.47 The disputed questions raised by Albert after the pro-
logue are also traditional, though his way of arranging them and subordinat-
ing them to one another seems original. Still, and however cliched the forms 
of his Summa, Albert's teaching in it on the relation of theology to the other 
sciences is both personal and deliberate. It is also a necessary supplement to 
the teaching of the Aristotle paraphrases. 
The prothema for Albert's prologue is Psalm 138, verse 6. He reads it as 
proclaiming that theology is higher than all the other sciences in six ways: 
in honor or nobility, in origin, in trustworthiness, in applicability, in demon-
strative force, and in the infinity of its object.48 Each of the six points is 
explicated by reference to philosophical teaching and to Scripture. So, for 
the first point, Albert reminds the reader of Aristotle's remarks in On the Soul 
about the wondrousness of knowing about soul. Theology is more wonderful, 
more honorable, and more noble. On the second point, again, Albert juxta-
poses Alfarabi with Scripture and Augustine to argue that only theology seals 
the soul with divinity itself. 
What is more striking, Albert uses the third heading to assert that theology is 
the only true science.49 He argues that even if the other sciences deal with 
immobile intelligibilities, they still learn of them by reflecting on moving crea-
tures. Only theology is grounded in the eternal rationes, completely removed 
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from motion. Thus only theology completely or chiefly fulfills the requirement 
that science be a stable knowledge drawn from intelligible things. Indeed, the-
ology is appropriately said to be God's science in each of the four orders of 
causality. God is the formal cause of every knowable and knower, and God is 
the efficient cause of theology by the action of the Holy Spirit. Again, God is 
the subject-matter with which the science is concerned. Finally, most importantly, 
God is the end towards which theology aims. It follows that theology is most 
truly wisdom because it is desired for its own sake without qualification. 
The claim that the science of the divine is the goal of knowing is reiterated 
under the fourth heading,50 but it receives its most important exposition in 
the questions of the treatise that follow the prologue. In the treatise Albert 
resolves a number of difficulties about the scientific character of theology by 
explaining that it is "a science according to piety (scientia secundum 
pietatem). "51 The phrase is a variation on the Vulgate of Titus 1: 1, "according 
to ... the apprehension of truth which is according to piety (secun-
dum ... agnitionem veritatis quae secundum pietatem est)." Albert invokes the 
phrase to describe a knowledge that instructs faith in the merit of certain 
deeds. This explicitly rhetorical knolwedge wants to persuade its students to 
love what they should do. It undertakes to persuade by narrating particular 
events and showing the actions of particular persons. 52 It does so because its 
unrestricted audience contains many who can learn only by means of partic-
ulars, which function for them as "universals in potency. "53 
In saying this much, Albert has not by any means exhausted the phrase 
from Titus. Indeed, he gives it central importance in the treatise by connecting 
it to two other doctrines. The first of these doctrines is Augustine's division 
of things into what signifies (signum), what is to be used (uti), what is to be 
enjoyed (jrui) , and what both uses and enjoys.54 Albert extracts from this 
division the teaching that theology is a unified and separate science just so 
far as it attends to signs and other useful things as means to the enjoyable. 55 
The second doctrine invoked by Albert asserts that the manner of theology, 
as exemplified in Scripture, ought to be multiply persuasive. Theology must 
then employ, not only the styles of affective rhetoric,56 but even the devices 
of the poetsY Thus Albert draws out from the Pauline phrase a description 
of theology as a hortatory knowledge of what can lead to salvation, that is, 
to the enjoyment of God. 
The two doctrines are properly joined for Albert because he holds that any 
responsible teaching about our highest end would have to try to move us 
towards it. He has in mind Aristotelian notions about the obligations of ethical 
discourse. So Albert notices Aristotle's concern for the limits on persuasion 
by mere argument for many hearers. 58 They must be taught, not by arguments, 
by by love or coercion. Indeed, because virtue is difficult for us, we need as 
many inducements to it as we can find, whether they are coercive or instruc-
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tive. 59 But Albert's tenet about the persuasive character of theology also 
derives, and more importantly, from the view that all knowledge, speculative 
or practical, is ordered to human fulfillment in the vision of God. 
The best known source for this view is Ps-Dionysius, who figures promi-
nently in the first treatise of the Summa. Albert relies particularly on the 
Dionysian assertion that the poetic devices of Scripture are so many "cover-
ings" (integumenta) or "veils" (velamina).60 But Albert knows well that the 
assertion reaches beyond the text of Scripture to describe every creature and 
every science about creatures. Human sciences lead their learners by the hand 
through progressively less material images until they are able to contemplate 
what is immateria1.61 The language of Scripture-which is to say, the manner 
of theology-recapitulates the pedagogy of the whole hierarchy of sciences. 
The artful persuasions used in theology make explicit the teleology that 
underlies the Aristotelian trichotomy of speculative sciences. The Aristotelian 
trichotomy turns out, once again, to be a small and somewhat misleading 
segment of a much larger and more various hierarchy crowned by Scripture. 
Albert makes his revaluation clear in a remarkable passage at the end of 
his discussion of theology. The passage is in the form of an objection, the 
body of which Albert both confirms and then underscores. 62 The objection 
narrates a sequence of motives that takes human learners through the arts and 
sciences. It supplies, as it were, the narrative of motive missing from Aris-
totle. The motives are all of them needs. Physical needs drive us to discover 
mechanical arts. The needs of the soul seek first for sciences of speech and 
logic as aids in further learning. Then they turn to physical bodies and their 
properties. But no knowledge of these can be had without knowledge of 
quantity and figure, so that the soul is driven to seek a mathematics. Yet the 
principles of mathematics are not to be found within it. They can only be had 
in a higher science, which the philosophers call first philosophy or theology. 
The objection wants to draw from the narrative a conclusion that the highest 
science cannot have any end at all, else it would be for the sake of something 
further and so subservient. Albert replies that there are internal ends and 
external ends. The external end of theology is in the person knowing it. The 
internal end is carried within the science itself. Thus theology is indeed, as 
the objection argued, the only free science. It is sought for its own sake. It 
is quite properly called 'wisdom', and it holds dominion and power over the 
other sciences. Their variety is required by the multiple weaknesses of human 
understanding, which needs a graded pedagogy in order to make progress 
towards apprehension of the simplicity of divine truth. Thus the hierarchy of 
sciences seems, from the vantage of theology, another instance of God's 
condescension. God reaches down by giving grace. The philosophers may be 
said to have a kind of "revelation" though the intellect's connatural light, but 
the actual contemplation of what is above requires the gracious giving of 
494 Faith and Philosophy 
another light, which is here anticipated only by faith. 63 Without grace, the 
motives of human inquiring would be cruelly unfulfilled. 
4. Albert s Descriptions of the Orders 
The three texts are important texts for understanding Albert on the hierarchy 
of sciences, but they are no more than that. Certainly there are other important 
texts, and certainly it would be possible to construct other progressions in 
Albert's teaching. My point has not been to engage in unprovable intellectual 
biography. I have wanted rather to illustrate how Albert responds to charac-
teristic tensions in the Aristotelian trichotomy of sciences. He responds, I 
think, by sypplying the missing narrative of the soul's ascent through the 
trichotomy and then explaining the narrative theologically. But I myself have 
omitted one feature of Albert's responses. I will end by retrieving it and by 
suggesting that it points to a further range of tensions and difficulties. 
In the last two texts discussed here, Albert includes in the narrative of 
ascent a requirement that the language of teaching become more negative as 
one moves higher. So, in On the Intellect, Albert quotes philosophical author-
ities in support of the assertion that the divine light "has no name and cannot 
be told of. "64 In the Summa, Albert lays out the whole Dionysian teaching 
about negative theology. To recognize that language fails more and more as 
one ascends adds another reversal to the account of the hierarchy. The most 
intelligible in itself is hardest for us to learn and impossible for us to describe 
except by negation. But the insistence on negation must also raise serious 
questions about descriptions of the hierarchy or of ascent along it. 
The simple way to capture these questions is to ask where Albert is standing 
when he speaks of the hierarchy. Is he at the bottom, or in the middle, or on 
top, or alongside? But it can be replied immediately to this formulation of 
the issue that Albert is not looking at the hierarchy. He is reading distinct, 
authoritative descriptions of the hierarchy. His first task as magister is not to 
describe what he sees or experiences, but to join together what he and his 
students read. So the question raised by the requirement of negation for 
Albert's descriptions must be put more tellingly. Do the restrictions on lan-
guage in the top of the hierarchy apply equally to descriptions of the top of 
the hierarchy as such? Again, is a description of the hierarchical position of 
metaphysics itself subject to the strictures on metaphysical language? 
Albert does not explicitly address this or related formulations of the issue. 
It might seem, moreover, that he proceeds with his description as if he imag-
ined that he possessed some neutral language outside the scientific languages 
of the various stages of the hierarchy. Indeed, it might be argued that Albert 
has himself here fallen victim to the confusion about the place of logic. He 
might be imagining that he can evade the limitations of negative theology by 
speaking merely as a logician. 
THE HIERARCHY OF SCIENCES 495 
Let me suggest that Albert is rather more cunning than this argument al-
lows. I noted at several points that his language becomes heavily charged 
whenever he describes the ascent to the top of the hierarchy. The pertinent 
passages of On the Intellect are filled with lyrical quotations from potent 
authorities, and the corresponding parts of other treatises repeat these or tell 
affecting stories of philosophical seeking. In the Summa, the reader is given 
a doctrine about the rhetorical character of theology. Because theology makes 
explicit the teleology of the ascent, and because it offers the only sure way 
of ascending, theological language must be variously persuasive. So too are 
Albert's remarks on the hierarchy of sciences. He does not offer them as 
descriptions or explanations or theories, so much as exhortations. So it is he 
tries from the opening of the Physics to convert the Aristotelian trichotomy 
into a persuasive account of the mind's manners and motives for inquiring. 
Albert is so quick to supply the missing narrative of ascent because only it 
can accomplish the kind of persuasion that any responsible presentation of 
the hierarchy must attempt. 
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operum." 
53. SUlllma theologiae 1.1.1 ad 1 (lAM 34:7.4-5): "potentia universalia." Albert dis-
misses as irrelevant an argument for theology's universality based on four senses of 
"universal" (34:7.11-29). 
54. Albert seems to take the distinction from the first chapters of Augustine's De 
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13], lAM 34:21.25-41). 
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a distinction between the few and the many, and Albert too begins his reply by alluding 
to such a distinction. But it seems to disappear when Albert gets to the limits on persuasion. 
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teaching. 
59. Summa theologiae 1.1.5.4 ad 13 (lAM 34:22.71-86). 
60. SUlllllla theologiae 1.1.5.1 objection I (lAM 34: 16.25), "sub integumentis 
metaphoricis," paraphrasing Celestial Hierarchy 2; 1.1.5.1 ad 2 (34: 17.3-4), "velaminum 
circumvalentum," quoting Celestial Hierarchy 1. 
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62. SUlllma theologiae 1.1.6 objection 3 (lAM 34:23.22-49). The source cited is Aris-
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64. De intel/ectu 2.9 (Borgnet 9:517a). 
